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Abstract
In a setting of economic and financial crisis, most companies experienced a reduction in their profitability. Thus, our study allows 
us to identify vertical integration strategies developed by companies to overcome the crisis. This paper is aimed at unveiling the 
determining factors of the profitability of Spanish agrifood firms, depending on whether they are backwards vertically integrated 
or not. In order to attain our objective, we implemented a first difference regression model. The main contributions of the article lie 
in the incorporation of a variable that distinguishes integrated firms from the rest and the separate analysis of the two groups of 
firms. The results suggest that firms that seek to differentiate themselves, either through offering a specific product or through 
providing higher quality with a view to maintaining their reputation, are more likely to adopt vertical integration due to the higher 
transaction costs of relations with suppliers. The grouping carried out in this study is shown to be highly relevant as asset structure 
implies different strategies for actions aimed at increasing profitability.
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Introduction
In the strict sense of the term, vertical integration 
means carrying out more than one activity within the 
value creation chain. The value chain includes all the 
stages in the process that transform raw materials into 
the finished product that is fit for consumption, and it 
thus includes activities related to supply, production 
and distribution. 
Here, we focus on the vertical integration of manu-
facturing firms. If such firms are only devoted to the 
second link in the chain, they purchase raw materials 
from third parties and sell the products to distributors. 
On occasions, the manufacturing firm may be inter-
ested in diversifying its primary exploitation and/or 
distribution activities. If the manufacturing firm under-
takes the activity of supplying raw materials, this re-
sults in a backwards vertical integration, whereby the 
firm becomes its own supplier. By the same token, if 
the manufacturing firm takes over the distribution of 
its products, this constitutes a forward vertical integra-
tion, where the firm becomes its own customer1.
According to transaction cost theory (Williamson, 
1986), the cost of organizing transactions represents 
the crucial factor in the choice of one organizational 
form or another. From this standpoint, the objective of 
vertical integration is the reduction of transaction costs 
or costs incurred by economic agents with a view to 
1  For a more in-depth description of the concept of vertical integration, see Salinas & Huerta (1999). 
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mining factors of the profitability of Spanish agrifood 
firms, depending on whether they are backwards verti-
cally integrated or not. 
Our results suggest that firms that seek to differenti-
ate themselves, either through offering a specific prod-
uct or through providing higher quality with a view to 
maintaining their reputation, are more likely to adopt 
vertical integration due to the higher transaction costs 
of relations with suppliers. The grouping carried out in 
this study is shown to be highly relevant as asset struc-




Vertical integration involves carrying out more than 
one activity within the value “creation chain”. When a 
firm is vertically integrated, it diversifies its activity, 
which affects the composition of its assets, along with 
the firm’s return on assets. The aim of this study is to 
analyze the factors that determine the profitability of 
firms in the agrifood industry based upon whether they 
are vertically integrated or not. 
This research examines these notions from the per-
spective of transaction cost theory, which states that 
economic activity is organized according to the costs 
implied in contractual relations within which business 
activity develops. Organizations adopt vertical integra-
tion if the costs involved in carrying out the activity 
themselves are less than the transaction costs, including 
the agency costs derived from the relationships between 
firm and supplier when purchasing the raw materials, 
or between firm and customer when distributing the 
finished product. 
Given the varying nature of the relationship with 
different stakeholders (suppliers and customers), we 
focused on the firm’s relationships with suppliers, leav-
ing the analysis of the firm’s relationship with custom-
ers and distributors for subsequent research. 
In the other hand, given that the decision to integrate 
vertically depends upon transaction costs and these 
depend, to a large extent, on the link in the value crea-
tion chain of the sector in which the firm operates, we 
isolated the effect of this factor by focusing our re-
search on a single sector: the agrifood industry. The 
agrifood industry only includes manufacturing firms 
from the food sector which transform raw agricultural, 
livestock and fishing materials. This research thus 
ensuring that agreements reached with other agents are 
adequately respected. Such advantages and cost saving 
will depend upon, among other factors, the character-
istics of the sector and the type of goods being manu-
factured. In terms of the disadvantages, firms have to 
invest more and withstand higher fixed costs in order 
to carry out another activity, which may involve a 
higher level of risk and greater operational leverage. 
In short, vertical integration is desirable if the advan-
tages inherent in “doing things yourself” outweigh the 
transaction costs or costs of operating in the market 
with another firm. 
This study allows us to uncover some of the reasons 
behind the decision to integrate vertically. In this sense, 
the literature points to the desire to maintain or reach a 
certain level of distinction or differentiation in the sector 
as a determining factor, either with a view to increasing 
reputation, or to offering specific or higher quality prod-
ucts. Several studies identify the adoption of vertical 
integration to this end, arguing that, if the objective of 
the manufacturer is to obtain a differentiated product in 
terms of quality and brand reputation, then the firm must 
engage in greater specific investment (see, among others, 
Bhuyan, 2005; Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009). A higher 
level of specificity of assets triggers, as we will go on 
to see, higher transaction costs due to the nature of the 
contractual relations with suppliers, which favors the 
decision to integrate vertically.
This paper studies the agrifood industry. Several stud-
ies, such as those of Frank & Henderson (1992), Bhuy-
an (2005) and Fernández-Olmos et al. (2009) identified 
factors that explain the vertical integration decision in 
agrifood firms2. We therefore considered this research 
to make significant contributions to the field, as these 
previous studies do not examine the effect of the vertical 
integration decision on firm profitability. 
Among the more notable studies that analyze the 
determinants of the profitability of this sector are those 
of Chaddad & Mondelli (2013) or Hirsch et al. (2014), 
which analyze the US food sector and, in the case of 
Spanish firms, Pindado & Alarcón (2015) produce find-
ings on the meat industry. Out of these studies, only 
Chaddad & Mondelli introduced diversification of the 
firm’s activity as an explanatory factor of profitability, 
using a dummy with a value of 1 if the firm has more 
than one business unit within the food sector. How-
ever, it did not distinguish between firms that carry out 
exploitation, manufacturing or distribution activities.
Thus, our study allows us to identify vertical integra-
tion strategies developed by companies to overcome 
the crisis. This paper is aimed at identifying the deter-
2 The study by Fischer & Hartmann (2010) takes a more in-depth look at the relations between the different stages of the agrifood 
chain.
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As transaction cost theory states, environmental 
uncertainty is notable if specificity is high, as it is more 
important to maintain the relationship between the par-
ties. Several authors (Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Díez, 
2007) point to the fact that, when environmental un-
certainty rises, the likelihood of vertical integration 
increases if the assets are specific. Fan (2000) reaches 
the same conclusion when studying the effect of price 
uncertainty on vertical integration in petrochemical 
companies.
Lastly, another factor underlined by Williamson 
(1986) is the frequency of transactions. The greater the 
frequency, the more necessary it becomes to take on 
uncertainty and specificity risks, which would increase 
the likelihood of vertical integration.
As we know, transaction costs will be higher in the 
firm-supplier relationship in accordance with the di-
vergence of interests and the asymmetry of informa-
tion between the parties, along with environmental 
uncertainty, specificity and the frequency of transac-
tions. Hennessy (1996) concludes that information 
asymmetry on crop quality and uncertainty are fun-
damental reasons for backwards vertical integration 
in the food sector. As agrifood products are fast-
moving consumer goods, the frequency of transactions 
is high. In addition, this sector is characterized by a 
high level of environmental uncertainty (climate, 
insect plagues, etc.). As previously indicated, these 
two factors are more important if they are combined 
with asset specificity. We therefore considered firms 
that seek to differentiate themselves to be more 
likely to control the process of obtaining raw materi-
als to a greater extent and thus they minimize the risk 
of a drop in quality in the final product. These firms 
undertake a greater moral risk, which will lead to 
greater costs in the relationship with suppliers and 
more reasons to vertically integrate. Some of the em-
pirical studies that demonstrate that transaction costs 
are determining factors of vertical integration in the 
food sector include those of Frank & Henderson 
(1992), Bhuyan (2005) and Fernández-Olmos et al. 
(2009).
We used economic-financial data for firms in this 
sector for the years 2008 and 2011; 2008 was a year of 
financial uncertainty, but the effects of the crisis had 
not yet reached all industries. Sectors that are less 
volatile and depend to a lesser extent on economic 
evolution, such as the food sector, tend not to be among 
the first to suffer the effects of any economic crisis3. 
An analysis of the subsequent evolution of firms in the 
focuses on a key, highly strategic sector for the Spanish 
economy. As shown in the report 2012 from the Span-
ish Federation of Food and Drink Industries (FIAB) 
(Muñoz & Sosvilla, 2013), this industry is the prime 
industrial sector in the Spanish economy due to the 
high level of foreign investment, the number of people 
it employs and its global turnover in the sector. 
A part of transaction costs are the agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) that represent the costs of 
overseeing, motivating and providing incentives in order 
to align the interests of the different parties in an agency 
relationship. The greater the divergence of these interests 
and the asymmetrical information passed between the 
parties, in this case between the manufacturing firm and 
the supplier, the greater the supervision and motivation 
costs, which means that backwards vertical integration 
becomes increasingly attractive in eliminating conflicts 
of interest and the costs derived from the agency rela-
tionship. Other aspects that affect transaction costs are 
the specificity of the assets to be exchanged, the fre-
quency of those exchanges and uncertainty.
With regard to asset specificity, an investment is 
specific if its best alternative usage implies a sizeable 
loss in value. We can talk about the specificity of fixed 
assets, of specialized employees or dedicated assets 
(Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009), that is to say, raw ma-
terials that are cultivated and produced and that, due to 
their characteristics and quality, are made for specific 
customers. According to Grant (1991), when specific-
ity is high, in terms of productive factors or with regard 
to distinctive competences, integration adds value. Some 
empirical studies conclude that specificity is related to 
vertical integration (Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Hen-
nart, 1988; Lieberman, 1991; Ohanian, 1994). Vicente 
(2000) also identifies vertical integration as a specific 
asset measure and believes that firms adopt vertical 
integration when the transaction involves certain spe-
cific assets whose profitability is subject to opportun-
istic expropriation by one of the parties. 
Another important factor related to transactions is 
uncertainty; a fundamental factor in the agrifood sector. 
Uncertainty refers to the ability of the parties in a trans-
action to ascertain and specify any possible contingen-
cies that might arise. This concept includes environ-
mental uncertainty (climate, insect plagues, demand 
elasticity, price variation for raw materials, etc.) and 
behavioral uncertainty (difficulty in anticipating the 
behavior of the other party in the relationship and of 
verifying the extent to which they comply with the 
contractual conditions).
3 The FIAB 2008 economic report (Muñoz & Sosvilla, 2009) shows the effect of the crisis that year to be minimal due to the 
comparatively low market risk of the sector. Production in the Spanish food industry underwent an increase of 1.3%., net sales went 
up and employment in the sector rose by 2.99%.
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are not vertically integrated and only carry out trans-
formation activities; and “Integrated”, a group made 
up of agrifood manufacturing firms with backwards 
vertical integration, that is to say, they carry out trans-
formation activities in the primary sector6. This way of 
grouping the firms allows us to analyze the relationship 
between economic profitability and vertical integration 
to greater depth. As we can see in Table 1, there is a 
only small percentage of vertically integrated firms, 
but we believe that this is not sufficient cause to con-
sider the results non-relevant, as we are taking into 
account the entire sample size for the group.
From the chosen sample, we firstly eliminated the 
firms whose data were unavailable for some of the 
figures. We secondly excluded any firms whose fig-
ures indicated extreme accounting data (net sales 
figures or total asset value) which could skew the 
results. We eliminated the observations that exceeded 
95% or fell below 5% of the sample distribution. This 
dual filtering process implied the loss of 9.26% of the 
original sample, ending up with a final total of 
5,402 firms.
Analysis of profitability 
The decision to integrate vertically implies carrying 
out new activities, which involves investment in assets 
with the hope that the costs of this investment will be 
lower than the profit it generates. For this reason, the 
variable we want to explain is return on assets, which 
relates the benefits of exploitation with total assets, 
depending upon whether the firm is vertically inte-
grated or not. Chaddad & Mondelli (2013) also intro-
duced vertical integration to explain the economic 
profitability of firms in the food sector, although they 
did not distinguish between firms that are backwards 
integrated, forwards integrated or both.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of return on 
assets (ROA) for all the groups considered in this study. 
It should be noted that, on average, all the groups ob-
tained a positive balance for the year 2008, though this 
was lower for vertically integrated firms. Once the 
crisis had begun to show its full effects (in 2011), aver-
age profitability underwent a sizeable reduction, and 
was most notable in the group of non-integrated firms. 
sector between 2008 and 2011 reveals the true effect 
of the economic-financial crisis, as well as the factors 
that have helped firms to overcome these adverse con-
ditions. We could also verify whether backwards verti-
cally integrated firms have managed to withstand the 
effects of the crisis better than others. 
Sample and variables
The sample is made up of firms from the Spanish 
agrifood industry. We obtained the data from the Bu-
reau van Dijk SABI database (http://www.bvdinfo.com/
es-es/our-products/company-information/national-
products/sabi), which provides information on firm 
activity using four-digit CNAE-2009 codes from the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
The main activity of these firms consists of manu-
facturing agrifood products whose 4-digit code of activ-
ity begins with 10, 11 or 12 (food, drink and tobacco 
production, respectively). From these classifications, 
on the one hand, we selected only manufacturing firms 
that do not carry out secondary activities, in other 
words, those that are not vertically integrated, and on 
the other, those that were backwards vertically inte-
grated throughout the chosen period; i.e. those that 
carry out secondary activities in the primary sector 
alongside their main activity and whose CNAE code 
begins with 01 or 03 (agriculture, livestock, game, fish-
ing and aquiculture) or with 023 (harvesting of forest 
products, not including timber4). 
We used economic-financial firm-level data for the 
years 2008 and 2011 for the following reasons: 2008 
is a year in which the effects of the crisis had still not 
shown up in the agrifood industry; and 2011 was a year 
in which there was notable recession within the period 
of the crisis, producing devastating economic data for 
the Spanish economy (Bank of Spain, 20115). We can 
therefore draw conclusions about the action strategies 
adopted by food production firms during the crisis ac-
cording to whether they are backwards vertically inte-
grated or not.
Table 1 shows the number of firms in the sample, 
classified into three groups: “Complete sample”, made 
up of all the agrifood manufacturing firms considered 
in the study; “Non-integrated” which shows firms that 
4 The remaining activities with codes pertain to forest and timber-related activities).
5 The worsening of the sovereign debt crisis impeded the slight recovery of the Spanish economy, immersing it in a period of 
recession; internal demand dropped sharply (1.7%), countering the measures taken since 2008; supply in all sectors has become 
weaker while the employment shortage has intensified since the summer, taking the economic crisis to new depths; the high level 
of debt does not allow for reforms that might allow for the imbalances that hinder economic recovery to be corrected.
6 They are diversified and carry out both an activity that begins with the CNAE-2009 code 10, 11 or 12 and those that start with 01, 
03 or 023.
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this type of study is a dummy variable that distin-
guishes between backwards vertically integrated and 
non-integrated firms.
We went on to show the descriptive statistics of all 
of these explanatory variables (see Table 3), in 2008 
(Panel A) and in 2011 (Panel B). We are unable to draw 
definitive conclusions from these data. However, we 
can highlight specific data that explain the expected 
relation between the explanatory variables and profit-
ability, as indicated in Table 2.
We firstly analyzed the variables cost efficiency 
(COSTEFFY) and asset turnover (TURNOV). The 
former indicates the proportion represented by operat-
ing costs over income so that the greater the value of 
this variable, the less efficient the firm is in term of 
costs and thus a negative relation can be expected be-
tween the variable COSTEFFY and profitability. The 
results in Table 3 show that, on average, integrated 
firms are less efficient.
TURNOV indicates the relation between the net 
sales and the total assets. The profitability of assets is 
the outcome of the product of two factors: turnover and 
margin8; in such a way that the firm can increase prof-
itability by taking action on either or both of these 
factors. Turnover is an indicator of the period of 
manufacturing, as longer periods imply lower turnover. 
Selling & Stickney (1989) studied 22 sectors in the US 
and concluded that fast-moving consumer goods sectors 
tend to have high turnover and low margins. As a result, 
this variable indicates that firms in this sector that have 
a low turnover follow product differentiation strategies, 
resulting in higher quality and a longer manufacturing 
period. When analyzing the profitability of the agrifood 
sector, Pindado & Alarcón (2015) observe that firms 
While average return on assets of the “integrated” firms 
continued to be positive, those of “non-integrated” 
firms went from having higher average profitability in 
2008 to negative average profitability. Both the number 
of firms from each subsample and the standard devia-
tion differ greatly, and thus definitive conclusions can-
not yet be drawn. 
These initial results lead us to reflect on and analyze 
the possible effects of vertical integration more deeply, 
and also to examine the characteristics that affect the 
profitability of these firms, along with the reasons that 
lead them to integrate. We questioned whether inte-
grated firms are more secure and less volatile due to 
the fact that they incorporate the supply of agrifood 
raw materials into their activity, and thus better with-
stand the conditions of the economic-financial crisis 
that is the framework for this research. For the period 
studied here, vertically integrated firms showed statis-
tically significant stable averages of profitability 
throughout the crisis, while firms that are not verti-
cally integrated went from a positive average profitabil-
ity to a negative one.
Analysis of the explanatory variables
This section presents the variables that we believe 
explain the return on assets of firms in the agrifood 
sector. Table 2 shows the variables considered here and 
the economic-financial dimensions used to construct 
them. As in other studies that analyze economic profit-
ability in the agrifood sector7, we used variables of 
productivity, size, liquidity and debt, along with indica-
tors of specificity. The novel aspect we introduced in 
7  See, among others, Chaddad & Mondelli (2013), Hirsch et al. (2014) and Pindado & Alarcón (2015). Other studies that examine 
vertical integration in the sector also used these variables.
8  EBIT/Asset (ROA) = EBIT/Sales (Margin) × Sales/Asset (Turnover).
Table 1. Sample and descriptive statistics of profitability. Panel A presents the size of the sample (N) and the descriptive statis-
tics for the years 2008 and 2011 for the profitability variable (ROA): the average, the standard deviation (SD) and the Jarque-
Bera (J-B) test for contrasting normality. Panel B provides the results of the averages contrasts that are equal to zero.
N
Panel A. Descriptive statistics Panel B. Average contrasts equal to zero
ROA (2008) ROA (2011)
ROA (2008) ROA (2011)
Average SD J-B Average SD J-B
Complete sample 5402 0.03289 0.10897 568665.80**  0.00025 0.15970 3540631.00** 22.78415** 34.87523**
Non-integrated 5195 0.03338 0.10996 549189.10**  –0.0000014 0.16179 3312333.00** 29.09241** 29.55377**
Integrated 207 0.02067 0.07969    381.51**  0.00644 0.09296     498.67** 37.95703** 41.60736**
Level of significance of the contrasts: 5% (*) and 1% (**).
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which firms operate. As Table 3 indicates, vertically 
integrated firms have, on average, greater assets 
(LOGASS) and market share (MARSHA) is somewhat 
lower, which ties in which the fact that average turno-
ver is also lower, as firms have to make larger invest-
ments in fixed assets.
Some studies argue that smaller firms adapt to 
changes to product demand more easily and at lower 
cost while being able to reach higher levels of quality 
by vertically integrating (Fernández, 2000). In addition, 
larger firms make more purchases and have greater 
negotiation power over their suppliers, which means 
they have less need to undertake the exploitation of 
raw materials to obtain supplies9. However, certain 
studies did not find a relationship between size and 
vertical integration, while others point to a positive 
relationship between the two variables (Ohanian, 1994; 
Fan, 2000; Leiblein & Miller, 2003). 
We expect the relationship between all these variables 
and profitability to be positive. Asset size generated a 
notable number of contradictions in terms of its capac-
ity to explain profitability, as a larger asset does not 
imply greater profitability if it does not involve effi-
ciency and productivity, which depends, among other 
things, on the characteristics and structure of the sector 
that adopt product differentiation strategies have lower 
asset turnover.
Table 3 shows that, on average, the asset turnover 
of integrated firms is lower. This suggests that these 
firms adopt product differentiation, which would con-
firm the suggestion that quality products result in 
higher transaction costs with suppliers and a higher 
chance of vertical integration. In the period of time 
from 2008 to 2011, average efficiency and the level of 
asset turnover is lower for all groups, which can be 
expected due to the influence of the crisis throughout 
this period.
We went on to analyze the size of the firms using 
the following variables: the logarithm of the total asset 
(LOGASS), the market share (MARSHA) and the 
quotient between the net sales of each firm and the net 
sales for the whole sector, as well as the variables of 
growth for the year, both in asset size (GROASS) and 
in market share (GROMARSHA).
We expect the relationship between all these varia-
bles and profitability to be positive, except for 
LOGASS. Asset size does not necessarily imply 
greater profitability if it does not involve efficiency 
and productivity, which will depend on, among other 
things, the characteristics and structure of the sector in 
9 Bhuyan (2005) and Fernández-Olmos et al. (2009) demonstrated a negative relationship between size and vertical integration 
explained by diseconomies of scale.
Table 2. Description of the explanatory variables.
Variables Description Relationa
Productivity variables
COSTEFFY Cost efficiency: Operating costs / Net sales (−)
TURNOV Asset turnover: Net sales / Total assets (+)
Variables of size
LOGASS Logarithm of total assets. (+/−)
MARSHA Market share: Net sales for the firm j/∑Net sales for the set of firms. (+)
GROASS Growth of assets: (Total yearly assets j–j-1)/Total yearly assets j-1. (+)
GROMARSHA Growth in market share: (Total yearly market share j–Total yearly market share j-1)/
Total yearly market share j-1.
(+)
Variables of liquidity and leverage
LIQUID Liquidity: Current assets/Liquid liabilities (+)
INDEB Indebtedness: (Liquid liabilities+Fixed liabilities)/Total liabilities and own equity. (−)
Other variables
DUMACT Dummy variable of the activity: has a value of 1 when the firm is backwards vertically 
integrated and a value of 0 if it is not vertically integrated. 
(+)
CREGRANT Trade credit granted: Receivable accounts with customers / Net sales. (+)
a Expected relation between profitability and the explanatory variable being studied. The expected relation between LOGASS and 
profitability could be either positive or negative.
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to the fact that average turnover is also lower, as great-
er investment in fixed assets is necessary.
The following group of variables deals with liquid-
ity and debt: liquidity (LIQUID) as the quotient be-
tween the current assets and the liquid liabilities, and 
the level of debt (INDEB) as a quotient between the 
total liabilities and the total financial resources We can 
expect a positive relationship between liquidity and 
profitability and a negative one between debt and prof-
itability due to the negative leverage effect as a conse-
quence of the crisis.
If we examine the statistical results (see Table 3), in 
general, the firms in our sample are extremely liquid and 
in which the firms operate. However, Chaddad & Mon-
delli (2013) and Hirsch et al. (2014) coincide in their 
findings on a positive effect on the agrifood sector. They 
attribute this conclusion to the fact that price competi-
tiveness is extremely important in this sector, and thus 
exploiting economies of scale is crucial for success. 
Chaddad & Mondelli (2013) also explain it from the 
point of view of transaction costs, as larger assets are 
in a better position to avoid contract costs and counter-
act the superiority of a highly concentrated distribution 
sector. As shown in Table 3, vertically integrated firms 
have, on average, larger assets (LOGAC) and market 
share (MARSHA) is somewhat lower, which is linked 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. This table presents the descriptive statistics, averages and standard 
deviation (SD) and Jarque-Bera (J-B) test for contrasting normality, for all the variables defined in Table 2 for the years 2008 
(Panel A) and 2011 (Panel B). The grouping ”Non-integrated” is made up of exclusively manufacturing firms from the database; 
“Integrated” manufacturing firms engage in a secondary activity from the primary sector; and “Complete sample” is the sum of 
the previous two.
N








Complete sample 5402 1.01531 0.41581 93161496** 1.44315 1.19473 32972.43 2.95160 0.71316 168.0594**
Non-integrated 5195 1.01115 0.40960 108000000** 1.45754 1.19525 33390.93 2.93924 0.71434 183.911**
Integrated 207 1.11970 0.53984 11939.39** 1.08197 1.12557 119.3868 3.26189 0.60688 0.083267
MARSHA GROASS GROMARSHA
Complete sample 5402 0.00013 0.00100 471000000** 0.08659 0.36306 2210951** 0.07593 1.00036 38391295**
Non-integrated 5195 0.00013 0.00102 421000000** 0.08471 0.36393 2244537** 0.07760 1.01786 34722979**
Integrated 207 0.00008 0.00021 7466.936** 0.13355 0.33804 1448.525** 0.03399 0.33634 216.1527**
LIQUID INDEB CREGRANT
Complete sample 5402 2.20413 3.42923 617841** 0.6557 0.3476 92653.6** 0.23837 0.54866 337000000**
Non-integrated 5195 2.22642 3.48100 565510** 0.6540 0.3501 91508.83** 0.22850 0.40403 61860883**
Integrated 207 1.64477 1.57152 1438.566** 0.6987 0.2777 0.463174 0.48605 1.92681 273773.3**
DUMACT







N COSTEFFY TURNOV LOGASS
Complete sample 5402 1.05933 0.55088 30129268** 1.33396 1.18101 171689.1 2.97130 0.72519 107.6825**
Non-integrated 5195 1.05679 0.55440 29770968** 1.34846 1.18648 170016.5 2.95878 0.72713 121.6277**
Integrated 207 1.12305 0.44997 2616.318** 0.96999 0.96777 97.90858 3.28532 0.59508 0.222963
MARSHA GROASS GROMARSHA
Complete sample 5402 0.00012 0.00087 253000000** 0.03073 0.25307 11484182** 0.09253 1.06004 15334985**
Non-integrated 5195 0.00013 0.00089 227000000** 0.03097 0.25597 10893565** 0.09637 1.07871 13840757**
Integrated 207 0.00008 0.00021 15587.26** 0.02463 0.16461 173.9545** -0.00378 0.33566 4044.294**
LIQUID INDEB CREGRANT
Complete sample 5402 2.61749 4.51273 858123.5** 0.65471 0.44939 341739.1** 0.28284 1.15060 796000000**
Non-integrated 5195 2.64110 4.58575 780377.8** 0.65415 0.45392 327844.8** 0.27892 1.16989 725000000**
Integrated 207 2.02497 1.82907 191.3094** 0.66875 0.31579 35.26463** 0.38144 0.43751 1870.949**
DUMACT
(complete sample) % firms with dummy = 1: 3.86%
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However, if the context is a period of crisis, certain 
studies (Grau & Reig, 2014; Martínez et al., 2014) 
show that an increase in customer accounts may be 
involuntary due to the increase in indebtedness created 
by the economic situation. Together with trade credit, 
the evolution in the level of debt in the firm may indi-
cate whether it has been able to create a good reputation 
or not10. Alternatively, if the firm, during a crisis, is 
more profitable but its level of debt has not been re-
duced, it may indicate that credit entities have no 
problem with lending them money due to the guaran-
tees the firm can offer.
Lastly, we introduced a dummy variable into our 
study (DUMACT) with a view to examining the po-
tential effects of backwards vertical integration. The 
variable has a value of 1 when the firm is in the “inte-
grated” group in Table 1, which means it carries out a 
combination of activities of transformation and the 
exploitation of raw materials, and has a value of 0 if 
the firm is in the “non-integrated” group, which only 
carries out transformation activities. Bearing in mind 
the arguments laid down in the previous section, we 
expect a positive relationship between this variable and 
profitability.
Empirical analysis
This section contains the econometric analysis that 
will enable us to examine the relationship between the 
profitability of Spanish manufacturing firms from the 
agrifood sector and vertical integration among these 
firms. The proposed methodology allows us to obtain 
robust results, not only due to the characteristics of the 
regression model itself and the method of estimation 
and contrast, but also due to the implementation of the 
variance inflation factor as a means of identifying po-
tential problems of multicollinearity.
In order to attain our objective, we chose a multi-
variate regression model that studies the explanatory 
capacity of the variables proposed in the previous sec-
tion on the evolution of return on assets. By using 
cross-sectional data, we can verify the effects of the 
final crisis from 2008 to 2011 on the behavior and 
evolution of the profitability of Spanish manufacturing 
firms in the agrifood sector. 
To analyze the consequences of a group of firms 
carrying out activities linked with the primary sector 
within the agrifood industry, we propose different re-
gression models. A first model that only includes firms 
that are not vertically integrated and are devoted ex-
show a high level of debt that has remained stable 
throughout the period chosen. The fact that the average 
debt level is similar in the three groups is unsurprising, 
as arguments exist that justify greater debt among firms 
that are vertically integrated while there are others that 
suggest the opposite (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). On the 
one hand, firms with more specific assets, because they 
have a greater tendency towards risk-taking, do not pro-
vide security to loan agents, but on the other, if specific-
ity can be identified with a good reputation and quality, 
the firm can be seen in a positive light by the loan agent.
We went on to introduce trade credit granted to cus-
tomers as an explanatory variable of profitability 
(CREGRANT). We measured it as the quotient between 
receivable accounts and net sales (Hernández de Cos 
& Hernando, 1999; Bahillo, 2000; Rodríguez, 2008; 
García & Martínez, 2010). By calculating the variable 
in this way, it measures the amount of trade credit 
granted to customers while also indicating the average 
period of payment. Agency theory argues that allowing 
an extension to the payment period for customers is a 
means of publicizing and establishing the characteris-
tics of quality products (Smith, 1987; Freixas, 1993; 
Long et al., 1993; Rodríguez, 2008) and, by offering 
advantages to customers, it becomes a way of creating 
a good reputation. 
As previously deduced theoretically, firms that 
manufacture specific products, that is to say, differen-
tiated, higher quality products and those that want to 
maintain a good reputation are more likely to verti-
cally integrate, and we can therefore expect them to 
offer greater trade credit. As shown in Table 3, the 
average value of this variable is notably higher in the 
sample of integrated firms for the two years considered.
With regard to the relationship between CREGRANT 
and return on assets, we can expect a positive relation, 
i.e. firms that extend a greater amount of trade credit 
will be more profitable, as extending more trade 
credit is used here as a proxy for establishing a high 
quality product and the desire to create a good reputa-
tion. Several studies show that offering extended pay-
ment periods to customers becomes more common in 
accordance with the quality and lack of public knowl-
edge about the product (Chee et al., 1999; Hernández 
de Cos & Hernando, 1999; Bahillo, 2000; Bastos & 
Pindado, 2007; García & Martínez, 2010; Grau & Reig, 
2014; Martínez et al., 2014). Chaddad & Mondelli 
(2013) use investment in intangible assets (R+D and 
advertising) as a measurement of specificity and also 
observe a positive relationship. We have not included 
this variable in the study due to lack of data.
10 For a more detailed analysis of the effects of reputation on profit, see Martínez & Olmedo (2010).
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(ii) it ensures that the idiosyncratic error ∀t, μ jt, is not 
correlated with the explanatory variable at both mo-
ments in time, and therefore guarantees that ∆μ j is not 
correlated to ∆Xj. 
The regression model proposed in the eq. [1] is es-
timated and contrasted using the Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) method. This procedure lends greater 
weighting to the more exact estimations, in other 
words, those that have a lesser degree of variability, 
when determining the coefficient regressions. In addi-
tion, this method was preferred to the more classical 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), for the following rea-
sons: (i) non-compliance with homoscedasticity; (ii) 
the presence of stylized facts in the financial data; and 
(iii) we incorporated the dummy variable DUMACT 
in our model, therefore, j refers to a firm and Xjt to a 
vertical integration vs. no vertical integration dummy 
variable, so that ∆Xj = ∀j, which justifies the fact that 
OLS are not used here.
After the regression procedure, we calculated the 
estimator of the βj coefficients for the first differences 
model, and carried out the individual contrasts (de 
Wald) and sets (betas equal to each other and equal to 
zero) of the parameters for each model, obtaining the 
series of errors. As a measurement of goodness of fit, 
we present the determination coefficient (adjusted R2). 
The estimation error is calculated by the sum of the 
squared average (errors due to estimation bias) added 
to the variance of the residuals from the model. 
The use of explanatory variables in the regression 
process could lead to multicollinearity problems, 
given the high degree of interrelation that could be 
established between them. Therefore, implementing 
techniques that allow us to identify and correct these 
problems is fundamental for obtaining statistics that 
allow for an objective argument. We can observe in 
Table 4 that many of our variables are significantly 
correlated and it is therefore advisable to confirm the 
presence/absence of multicollinearity. To this end, we 
applied the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the 
three groupings we propose and the two economic 
years. Neter et al. (1989)12 suggest that individual 
values for the VIF that are greater than ten indicate 
problems of multicollinearity, as do average values 
of higher than six. The VIF values shown in Table 4 
(see the end columns) indicate that this problem is not 
manifested in the models used either at an individual 
level or as an average for any of the groupings con-
sidered or the economic years addressed (2008 and 
2011).
clusively to manufacturing (Model 1); a second regres-
sion where we only analyze firms that adopt backwards 
vertical integration or who, in other words, carry out 
first and second step activities in the value chain to-
gether (Model 2); and a third regression (Model 0) in 
which all firms are included from the two previous 
models and where a dummy activity variable is intro-
duced (DUMACT). We can thus verify whether verti-
cal integration is a determinant of profitability or not. 
We aim to measure the behavior of economic profit-
ability using two key periods as a points of reference: 
the beginning of the crisis (2008) and a later date when 
the crisis was at its height (2011). To this end, we im-
plement a first difference regression model (please see 
the complete model in Fig. S1 [online supplement]), 
with the following structure:
∆ROAjt = α + βCOSTEFFY · ∆COSTEFFYjt +  
+ βCREGRANT · ∆CREGRANTjt +
+ βTURNOV · ∆TURNOVjt + βLOGASS · ∆LOGASSjt +  
+ βMARSHA · ∆MARSHAjt + βGROASS · ∆GROASSjt +  [1]
+ βGROMARSHA · ∆GROMARSHAjt + βLIQUID · ∆LIQUIDjt  +
+ βINDEB · ∆INDEBjt + βDUMACT · DUMACTjt+ εjt
∆ROAj = ROA2011 – ROA2008 ; ∆Fj = F2011 – F2008
where “∆” represents the change from the year 2008 
to the year 2011. More precisely,  shows the change in 
the firm’s economic profitability j (j = 1, …, N), cal-
culated as the quotient between profit before interest 
and taxes and total assets; δ0 represents the intercept 
(constant) of the regression; the βj∀j = COSTEFFY, 
CREGRANT, TURNOV, LOGASS, MARSHA, 
GROASS, GROMARSHA, LIQUID, INDEB and DU-
MACT11, represent the estimated values of the regres-
sion coefficients in a cross-section for the incremental 
variables studied here. As with the explained variable, 
the explanatory variables are also expressed in incre-
mental terms, that is to say, ∆Fj = F2011 – F2008 , for F = 
COSTEFFY, CREGRANT, TURNOV, LOGASS, 
MARSHA, GROASS, GROMARSHA, LIQUID and 
INDEB. Finally, μjt is the independent idiosyncratic 
error and is equally distributed using N (0, σ 2j).
We selected a first difference regression model for 
several reasons: (i) it eliminates problems of unob-
served heterogeneity; as it is defined in terms of dif-
ferences, this component is completely removed (see 
eq. [S1.4] in Fig. S1). This term encompasses all the 
unobserved factors that do not change over time and 
11 The variable DUMACT only appears in Model 0, which includes both vertically integrated and non-integrated firms.
12 Alternatively, see the manual of Hair et al. (1999).
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although they did not distinguish between different 
forms of diversification.
Our result indicates that the majority of the firms 
whose profitability has not gone down during the pe-
riod considered are backwards vertically integrated. 
Indeed, agrifood firms that have to acquire raw materi-
als from third parties are more exposed to the eco-
nomic situation, and have experienced a reduction in 
their economic profitability to a greater extent during 
the crisis. However, backwards vertically integrated 
firms have scarcely seen a change in the profitability 
obtained before and after the crisis; demonstrating 
greater stability and less dependency on the economic 
climate.
From the results obtained with the other variables, 
we can see that the firms that are least vulnerable to 
the economic situation, i.e. they have not undergone 
a reduction in economic profitability during the crisis 
period, are characterized by having increased cost 
Results and discussion
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions carried 
out to explain the profitability of firms in the agrifood 
industry, depending upon whether they are backwards 
vertically integrated or not. The results of the study 
are presented as follows: we begin by analyzing the 
results obtained via the model that includes all the 
firms in the sample (Model 0); we then discuss and 
compare the results from Models 1 and 2, which allow 
us to observe the effect of the decision to adopt back-
wards vertical integration on the determining factors 
of profitability.
When analyzing the first results from the regression 
shown in Table 5 (Panel A), we noted that, for Model 
0, as we expected, the dummy variable (DUMACT) is 
significantly not null and is positive. Chaddad & Mon-
delli (2013) also concluded that diversification has a 
positive effect on economic profitability in this sector, 
Table 4. Bivariate correlations and diagnosis of multicollinearity of the explanatory variables. Data are provided of all the firms 
considered in the year 2008 (Panel A) and 2011 (Panel B): bivariate correlations with a level of significance and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) to diagnose the presence/absence of multicollinearity for the largest group “Total sample”.













ROA 1 1.15205 1.48202 1.16105
COSTEFFY -0.23693** 1 1.13855 1.46395 1.14886
CREGRANT -0.00577 0.31872** 1 1.14953 1.19665 1.1522
TURNOV -0.01532 -0.05284** -0.06675** 1 1.30673 1.47029 1.30188
LOGASS 0.18937** -0.09939** -0.01497 -0.45750** 1 1.06129 1.34939 1.06069
MARSHA 0.00861 -0.00934 -0.00645 0.08467** 0.08973** 1 1.00332 1.07893 1.01573
GROASS 0.09623** -0.03685** 0.06315** -0.24065** 0.28104** 0.00393 1 1.01194 1.10806 1.01222
GROMARSHA -0.00822 0.01421 -0.00308 -0.01179 0.00807 -0.00079 0.0924** 1 1.08877 1.16731 1.09037
LIQUID 0.03344* -0.04543** 0.00156 -0.03367* 0.01179 -0.00206 -0.00753 0.00838 1 1.15075 1.27474 1.15314
INDEB -0.39614** 0.11412** 0.01614 0.05101** -0.08586** 0.01698 -0.01853 -0.00054 -0.15349** 1 1.10187 1.14958 1.10094







ROA 1 1.16879 1.49876 1.17779
COSTEFFY -0.28230** 1 1.15529 1.48069 1.16565
CREGRANT -0.00266 0.32879** 1 1.16627 1.21339 1.16894
TURNOV -0.07861** -0.10807** -0.12808** 1 1.32347 1.48703 1.31862
LOGASS 0.18300** -0.02207 0.04078** -0.33609** 1 1.07156 1.35966 1.07096
MARSHA 0.04308** -0.02024 -0.01261 0.05924** 0.30771** 1 1.01359 1.0892 1.02670
GROASS 0.19864** -0.09983** -0.00632 -0.05488** 0.08250** 0.00340 1 1.02221 1.11833 1.02249
GROMARSHA 0.02400 -0.01494 -0.01745 -0.01314 0.01997 -0.00748 0.01313 1 1.09904 1.17758 1.10064
LIQUID 0.04776** 0.01975 0.03157** -0.10945** -0.01403 -0.02886* -0.0307** 0.00437 1 1.16102 1.28501 1.16341
INDEB -0.39657** 0.12683** 0.01433 0.13776** -0.18693** -0.01878 -0.02562 -0.00687 -0.31440** 1 1.11214 1.15985 1.11121
Average VIF 1.12934 1.28695 1.13257
Level of significance of the contrasts: 5% (*) and 1% (**). 
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demonstrated better performance, as shown by the 
previous variable. Chaddad & Mondelli (2013) and 
Hirsch et al. (2014) obtained the same finding with 
regard to size, which we attribute to the fact that price 
competitiveness is so important in this sector, and thus 
benefiting from economies of scale is essential for 
success. 
The result obtained with the variable CREGRANT 
is consistent with the school of thought that indicates 
that business credit can be interpreted as a sign of a 
good reputation (Smith, 1987; Freixas, 1993; Long et 
al., 1993; Rodríguez, 2008). We also posited previ-
ously that if the context is one of a period of crisis, an 
increase in customer accounts may be involuntary due 
to the indebtedness created by the financial situation. 
Our results appear to indicate that the firms that have 
reduced the amount of commercial credit receivable 
by customers have not been able to maintain their lev-
els of sales, and consequently, the loss of customers 
has been greater than the increase in indebtedness 
brought about by the financial crisis. Consequently, the 
reduction of this variable, in general terms, leads to a 
decrease in profitability.
efficiency (COSTEFFY)13 and asset turnover for the 
period analyzed (TURNOV); by having grown in size 
(LOGASS and GROASS), reduced their level of debt 
(INDEB) and finally by having increased trade cred-
it granted to customers (CREGRANT). 
The results are consistent with the forecast and 
discussion made previously when presenting the 
explanatory variables. With regard to asset turnover 
(TURNOV), in line with the results obtained by Sell-
ing & Stickney (1989), we observed that, as this is 
a sector with fast-moving consumer goods, firms act 
on their asset turnover to increase profitability and 
given that we are undergoing a period of crisis with 
a general reduction in sales margins, firms that make 
an effort to increase the turnover of their assets and 
those that have increased their profitability tend to 
fare better. In addition, firms that have put their fi-
nancial structure in order and have reduced leverage 
(INDEB) have suffered less of a reduction in profit-
ability. 
Firms that have been able to make investments in 
production and create growth (LOGASS and 
GROASS) by investing their own resources have also 
Table 5. Determinants of firm profitability. Panels A, B and C present the regression results (using Weighted Least Squares: 
WLS) of the first differences model described in the Eq. [1], where the dependent variable is return on assets of the firm (ROA). 
The same number of regressions was carried out as proposed models. Regression coefficients are provided and the standard 
deviation (SD) is given in brackets. In addition, Panel D shows the combined significance contrast (F statistic), the goodness of 
fit of each model (adjusted R2), and the estimation error of each model, calculated as the sum of the squared average (error due 
to bias) and the variance of the residuals of the model.
c βCOSTEFFY βTURNOV βLOGASS βMARSHA βGROASS βGROMARSHA βLIQUID βINDEB βCREGRANT βDUMACT
Panel A: Regression using WLS for “Complete sample” (Model 0).  N=5402
Coefficient -0.04282** -0.09306** 0.19874** 0.03154** -7.75248 0.02947** 2.02762 -0.00216 -0.10943** 0.01205** 0.01806**
SD (0.00188) (0.00054) (0.00279) (0.02828) (8.13491) (0.01678) (0.00325) (0.00611) (0.00479) (0.00194) (0.01009)
Panel B: Regression using WLS for “Non-integrated” (Model 1).  N=5195
Coefficient -0.03178** -0.10252** 0.15178** 0.02775** -9.57474 0.03843** 2.01984 -0.00233 -0.12701** 0.01340**
SD (0.00175) (0.00063) (0.00287) (0.02828) (8.06871) (0.01678) (0.0036) (0.00437) (0.00519) (0.00212)  
Panel C: Regression using WLS for “Integrated” (Model 2).  N=207
Coefficient -0.00141 -0.11067** 0.09927 -0.03675 46.03766* 0.00672* -0.06734 1.86420 -0.17864** 0.02034**
SD (0.00094) (0.00643) (0.09375) (0.01793) (29.90762) (0.01294) (0.04157) (0.47672) (0.02645) (0.00311)  
Panel D: Other statistics for the three sets
 Complete sample Non-integrated Integrated
F statistic 237.96478** 226.87511** 21.97042**
Adjusted R2 0.36196 0.35675 0.40531
Error estimation 0.03578 0.03109 0.02142      
Level of significance of the contrasts: 5% (*) and 1% (**).
13 It should be remembered that a higher value of this variable indicates less cost efficiency, which is why it is negative in Table 5.
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by putting the financial structure in order and have 
increased the amount of customers, granting greater 
business credit. However, if firms are not vertically 
integrated, they have had to make more of an effort and 
act upon asset turnover when faced with a reduction in 
margins during a period of financial crisis, while verti-
cally integrated firms have acted on the margin, as 
TURNOV is not significant. However, if firms do not 
carry out additional activities, they are less vulnerable 
to the effects of the crisis if they have been able to 
increase investments or, alternatively, if they are back-
wards vertically integrated firms that have attempted 
to increase their market share. 
The main conclusions obtained from the study are 
as follows. Firstly, one factor that has determined 
whether or not the firm has maintained, or even in-
creased its profitability during the period of crisis is 
the adoption of backwards vertical integration itself. 
We have also demonstrated the existence of a direct 
relationship between integration and specificity, and 
can thus state that firms who manufacture more spe-
cific, differentiated products have a greater chance 
of diminishing the effects of an adverse economic 
situation. Secondly, another conclusion to highlight 
is the relevance of the grouping of firms carried out 
in this study. By analyzing the whole sample to-
gether, it can be observed that the heterogeneity of 
the group is not taken into account and obtaining 
conclusive results becomes more difficult. In fact, 
analyzing the two groups of firms separately reveals 
that the same set of variables does not determine their 
profitability. 
In order to continue this research and examine the 
phenomenon in greater depth, we believe it would be 
appropriate to complement this study with an analysis 
of forwards vertical integration, which includes the 
third link in the value creation chain: distribution. 
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